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The Future of the Forestry Sector in Ireland 
Siobhan McCarthy, Lecturer in Economics, Dublin Institute of 
Technology * 
The most recent government strategy statement on forestry sets a planting target of 
20,000 hectares annually for the Republic of Ireland, but in recent years this target 
has not been met. Public afforestation is now limited to the management and 
replacement of existing forests, so private afforestation must increase if this target is 
to be achieved. This article quantifies the relative importance of competing forestry 
and agricultural policy incentives in explaining trends in private afforestation. 
Several policy reforms to encourage forestry planting are proposed, including 
greater integration of forestry with the Rural Environment Protection Scheme and 
increasing the upfront payments which farmers receive. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ireland is a very suitable location for planting forestry. Yet, despite this, it has the 
lowest forest to land ratio in the EU. A feature of Irish forestry is its strong 
interdependent relationship with the agricultural sector. This situation is complicated 
by the fact that both sectors are highly subsidised. In 1996 the Irish government 
produced an afforestation programme, Growing for the Future, A Strategic Plan for the 
Development of the Forestry Sector in Ireland. This programme set national planting 
targets of 20,000 hectares (ha) per annum from 2001 to 2030. After a promising start, 
actual planting levels have fallen to little more than half this target. Recent increases 
in agricultural subsidies are believed to have negatively impacted on the level of 
forestry planting, particularly by farmers. 
Although methods of increasing the level of forestry planting to meet the national 
afforestation target are suggested later, it should be noted that an examination of 
whether this target is the optimal level of forestry planting is beyond the scope of this 
article.[1] 
* The author gratefully acknowledges receipt of a Walsh Fellowship from Teagasc in order to pursue this research. Comments 
from Alan Matthews, Brendan Riordan, Peter Clinch, Brendan Kearney and Micheal Bulfin are gratefully acknowledged, 
although the opinions expressed are the responsibility of the author alone. Contact details: Email: siobhan.mccarthy@ditie 
[1] See Clinch, 1999, for a discussion of this topic. 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Historically, widespread deforestation has been this country's order of the day. Without 
reviewing the entire history of the Irish forestry sector, it is worthwhile to highlight that, 
until the beginning of the 17th century, Ireland was covered with dense forests.[2] 
Several factors led to the forest clearance, the most important of which were the rise 
of Britain as a major naval and industrial power and the introduction of the Land Acts 
in the 1870s, giving rise to widespread deforestation and agricultural expansion. By 
the time of the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, there remained just over 
90,000 hectares of forestry. Little changed under the newly established Irish 
administration, as 50% of the population was employed in farming and there was 
strong opposition to forestry from the farming community. 
The new inter-party government of 1948 brought with it a significant change in forestry 
policy, due in large part to the Minister for External Affairs, Sean McBride. He set a 
planting target of just over 10,000 hectares per annum. Although the level of public 
afforestation increased, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient land proved to be a 
significant impedimentJ3] Therefore, these ambitious planting targets were not met 
until 1959/1960. Subsequently, public planting declined particularly in the period 1972 
to 1985. This problem intensified on I reland's joining the EEC/EU, due to increases in 
agricultural subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). During the 1990s 
increasing forestry land prices and higher levels of private afforestation have caused a 
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Source: The Forest Service, 1999 
[2] Kula, 1988 
[3] Public Afforestation refers to forestry being planted by the state on land which was not previously under forestry. 
Reforestation refers to planting land which was previously planted with forestry. Public Planting refers to both public 





[4] Private Afforestation refers to forestry being planted by private planters on land which was not previously under forestry. 
[5] This is the level of forestry planted on land previously not under forestry and therefore excludes reforestation. 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AFFORESTATION POLICY 
In the 1990s the government's focus on purely public forestry changed to emphasise 
partnership with the private forestry sector. This partnership materialised in a number 
of schemes including the Farm Partnership Scheme. Introduced in 1992 by Coillte -
the body established in 1988 to take control of the State forests - this has proven 
particularly popular. On entering this scheme, the landowner receives an upfront 
payment and tax-free income throughout the rotation of the forest. The landowner also 
receives the applicable forestry annual payments that are paid to all planters outside 
this scheme. The landowner retains full ownership of the land, but Coillte provides the 
necessary management and marketing skills. 
The government, through Coillte, will not be involved in any future land acquisition for 
public afforestation, partly because public planting will no longer be eligible for forestry 
subsidies. In the future, public afforestation will be limited to reforestation. 
Private afforestation was basically non existent until the 1980s. State forestry grants 
were introduced for private afforestation in 1928 and still remain in place today. These 
are generally paid in several instalments. The first payment is known as the planting 
grant, which covers the main planting expenses and is paid on completion of planting. 
The subsequent grants, known as maintenance grants, are paid a specified number of 
years after planting occurs and are intended to cover the main costs of maintaining 
the forest in its early years. However, forestry remained a secondary land activity to 
agriculture and the main aim of Irish private forestry policy in the period 1922 to 1977 
was to restrict private afforestation to land that was unsuitable for any agricultural 
activity. 
New financial schemes introduced throughout the 1980s and 1990s to encourage 
landowners to plant forestry were spurred on by the manner in which overall EU policy 
moved towards offering incentives to farmers to move out of agriculture in favour of 
alternative land use enterprises. The Western Package Scheme was introduced in 
1981 in twelve western counties and this scheme increased forestry grants 
substantially for forestry planted by farmers on disadvantaged land. A unified scheme 
was introduced in 1991 which distinguished only between previously enclosed or 
unenclosed land and, since then, forestry grants have been regularly increasedJ6] 
The first attempt to address the problem of lack of annual income for farmers who 
plant forestry came in the introduction of the Compensatory Headage Scheme in the 
[6] See McCarthy et. ai , 2002 
period 1986/1987. These payments were payable to farmers who planted forestry and 
who otherwise were entitled to livestock headage grants in disadvantaged areas. The 
Forest Premium Scheme replaced this scheme in 1989. The conditions attached to 
these payments and the payment amounts have varied and been increased over time, 
distinguishing between the nature of the land planted to forestry and whether the 
farmer had off-farm income or not. The scheme was extended to non-farmers and 
companies in 1994 at reduced rates. 
Since the late 1980s there has been a sharp increase in the level of private 
afforestation in terms of hectares planted and as a proportion of total afforestation[7] 
(See Figure 2). Private and total afforestation peaked in 1995, but declined sharply 
thereafter despite the recent increases in forestry grants and premia. 
FIGURE 2: TOTAL AND PRIVATE AFFORESTATION 1980-2000 
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One of the main reasons put forward for the fall in the level of private afforestation is 
the recent changes in agricultural policy. Two of the most important are the 
introduction of the Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) and the changes in 
the eligibility rules for the extensification premium. 
REPS is a five-year scheme, whereby the farmer enters a contract to farm in 
accordance with an agri-environmental plan. In terms of competing with forestry for 
land the main relevant aspects of REPS are the rate of the REPS premium, the 
[7] Total afforestation is the sum of public and private afforestation. 
maximum area on which the premium is payable and the cost of compliance. By the 
end of 1999, 33% of agricultural land was being farmed under REPS guidelines. 
Although there is no restriction on planting forestry on land entered' into REPS, 
farmers cannot receive both REPS premia and forestry premia on the same land. 
The extensification premium is somewhat different from other agricultural subsidies as 
it has an environmental objective; that is, it is a premium paid to farmers for cattle if 
their stocking density (number of animals) is kept under certain limits per hectare. 
Under the 1999 CAP reform the eligibility rules for the extensification premium were 
altered by reducing the stocking density. This is relevant to forestry as it increases the 
demand for land thereby reducing the amount of land available for afforestation 
purposes. 
THE ROLE OF CONFLICTING INCENTIVES 
Several economic factors influence the level of private forestry planting in the Republic 
of Ireland. The afforestation regression model used in this analysis assumes that 
farmers weigh up the competing returns from forestry and agricultural production in 
deciding whether to plant trees or not (See Appendix for detail of the model used in 
this regression analysis). The forestry returns are composed of the net revenue from 
the sale of timber over the lifetime of the forest, forestry grants and the forest 
premium. Agricultural returns are proxied by the gross margin obtained from cattle and 
sheep production, which are the most common enterprises found on the marginal land 
in Ireland most likely to be used for forestry. In addition, account is taken of the 
competing attraction of enrolling land in REPS. Other factors such as the price of 
forestry land and the level of tax incentives for forestry can also be important.[8] 
These factors operate against a background of generally negative attitudes among 
farmers towards planting forestry in the Republic, where there is no tradition of 
integrating forestry with farming and where forestry is seen as competing with 
agriculture for the scare resource of land.l9] The level of risk may also be an 
influencing factor, due to the long time span before forestry yields returns and the 
inflation risk attaching to forestry subsidies. 
Previous empirical analysis of the determinants of Irish afforestation used time series 
data which suffered from the limited number of observations available through time.l10] 
[8] See McCarthy, 2002 for a discussion on why these factors were not included in this regression model. 
[9] See McCarthy, 2002 for details; also McCarthy et ai, 2002. 
[10] Barrett and Trace, 1999 
The empirical analysis supporting this article used a panel data set based on county-
level data covering the time period 1982 to 1999 for the twenty-six counties of the 
Republic of Ireland with explanatory variables, where appropriate expressed in 1999 
constant prices)9] A panel data set has the advantage of gaining observations for 
estimation and increasing the accuracy of the regression estimates. There are of 
course certain limitations in using panel data, including data limitation problems and 
the fact that it is not possible to include lagged dependent or independent variables as 
independent variables.t11 ] 
The model is estimated as a fixed effects model in which planters in each county are 
assumed to respond in the same way to changes in the independent variables, but 
there are fixed (constant) differences in planting levels across counties due to 
unspecified county differences. The fixed effects model is appropriate if the cross-
sectional[12] terms are 'one of a kind' and cannot be viewed as a random draw from 
the underlying population. This is the case for this analysis where all the cross-
sectional terms represent counties. 
A log-log regression model is used, as this is consistent with previous regression 
analysis in this area and because of the significant differences in the absolute values of 
the independent variables in levels. Thus the coefficient estimates can be interpreted 
as elasticities. Elasticities in this model represent the percentage change in the level of 
private afforestation caused by a 1 % change in any of the independent variables. 
Four variables are shown to be statistically significant in explaining private 
afforestation at a 1 % significance level: the forestry planting grant, forestry subsidies, 
the expected forestry market margin and the area entered into REPS. The agricultural 
gross margin was not found to be a statistically significant explanatory factor. Table 1 
shows these coefficients of the variables for this regression analysis. 
To explain the results, the example of the forestry planting grant can be taken. This 
variable's coefficient is 2.83 which means that a 1 % increase in the level of the 
forestry planting grant calculated at the sample mean would lead to a 2.83% increase 
in the level of private afforestation. This value can be converted into a marginal effect 
which is a format useful for policy analysis that measures the response of a one unit 
change in the various explanatory variables on the level of private afforestation. This is 
done by dividing the elasticity by the ratio of the means of the dependent variable and 
[11] The independent variables are the explanatory variables in the regression model, in this case, the forestry market margin, 
the forestry planting grant, the forestry subsidies, the agricultural gross margin and the area entered into REPS. The 
regression attempts to identify which independent variables influence the dependent variable, in this case, the level of 
private afforestation. [12] Cross sectional data are data on one or more variables collected at the same point in time. 
TABLE 1: PANEL REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR PRIVATE AFFORESTATION 
Variables Units Coefficient 
Constant 
-33.09 
Forestry Planting Grant 
€ in 1999 prices per hectare 2.83 
Forestry Subsidies NPV (Net Present Value) in 1999 prices per ha 2.12 
Forestry Market Margin 5% of NPV in 1999 prices per ha 0.03 
Agricultural Gross Margin 
€ in 1999 prices per hectare 
-0.01 
Area Entered into REPS Hectares -0.02 
R2 (overall)[14l 0.82 
R2 (within)[lSl 0.55 
Note: Dependent variable: Private Afforestation on a County Level (ha) per annum in logs 








the independent variable.t16] Because the dependent variable is the annual planting by 
county, to convert this to a national figure it is multiplied by 26. The marginal effect of 
the forestry planting grant is 20.28, which is interpreted to mean that every €1 
increase in the value of the forestry planting grant leads to a 20.28 hectare increase in 
the national annual level of private afforestation (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2: MARGINAL EnEaS OF INFLUENCES ON FORESTRY PLANTING 
Variables 
Forestry Market Margin 
Forestry Planting Grant 
Forestry Subsidies 
Area Entered into REPS 
Source: McCarthy, 2002 
Units 
5% of NPV in € in 1999 prices per hectare 
€ in 1999 prices per hectare 
NPV in € in 1999 prices per hectare 
Hectares 
Marginal effect of a one unit 





[13] The P value is the probability value which is defined as the lowest significance value at which the null hypothesis that each 
of the coefficients is zero can be rejected. [14] The overall R2 value measures the goodness of fit, that is the total variation in the dependent variable that can be explained 
by changes in the independent variables. The within R2 is the more usual measure used for fixed effects panel regression 
models. [15] Not adjusted for robust standard errors, due to the way Stata calculates this measure of within variation. [16] For the purpose of the results reported in Table 2, the time period is restricted to 1994-1999 in order to be consistent across 
all variables, as the Area under REPS variable only exists for this time period. However, for the other variables the reported 
values differ little from those calculated using the entire sample period. 
FORESTRY MARKET MARGIN 
The forestry market margin is the Net Present Value (NPV) of the difference between 
the revenue and costs flows over the rotation of the forest, expressed as an annual 
annuity calculated at a 5% discount rate)17] There are two main sources of revenue 
from timber production: namely, thinnings and clearcutting revenue. Thinning is the 
cutting out of selected trees from a plantation to improve the growth and quality of the 
remaining trees and clearcutting is the final cutting at the end of a rotation)2] 
Clearcutting revenue will be highly discounted as this timber revenue will not transpire 
for at least 40 years. Timber revenue depends on the tree species, the timber price, 
the average volume of timber per tree, the number of trees per hectare and the 
average yield class)18] The costs include establishment costs, fencing, road and drain 
repairs, road construction as well as the costs of marking and measuring the trees for 
thinning. Farmers are assumed to calculate future expected returns on the basis of 
an average of prices prevailing currently for timber and over the previous four years)9] 
The marginal effect of the expected forestry market margin is positive. However, at 
just 1.66 hectares for every €1 increase in the annual annuity, its economic 
significance is very limited. Most experts concur that the vast majority of farmers do 
not consider the forestry market margin when deciding whether to plant their land. 
THE FORESTRY PLANTING GRANT AND SUBSIDIES 
The impact of the initial forestry planting grant - paid in the first year - and other 
forestry subsidies are separately distinguished. Forestry subsidies are a combination 
of the forestry maintenance grant payments and either forestry premia payments or 
compensatory headage payments as defined previously. The main purpose in 
combining these particular payments into a separate variable is to make a distinction 
between payments given to planters as upfront payments and delayed payments. This 
distinction is important as upfront payments do not suffer from the risks of inflation 
which are associated with delayed payments. 
The marginal effect of the forestry planting grant is 20.28: that is, every €1 increase in 
the forestry planting grant will lead to a 20.28 hectare increase in the level of private 
afforestation while the marginal effect of forestry subsidies is 9.16. The marginal 
effect for the forestry planting grant is 2.2 times the marginal effect for the forestry 
subsidies for equivalent changes in expenditure measured in NPV terms. This implies 
[17] The following formula is used for this calculation I,~ R, - e" where Rj and Cj are forestry returns and costs in year i and 
n is the year of clearcutting. (1 +.05) [18] The yield class of a tree is a measure of the quantity of the timber produced from a stand of trees as a function of time 
(Clinch, 1999). It is assumed that Sitka Spruce is planted as this is the most popular species planted in Ireland. 
that increasing the planting grant in preference to forestry premia would be a more 
cost efficient method of increasing private afforestation. This proposition seems to 
make sense, as the planter will receive any increase in the planting grant in the year 
of planting compared to any increase in the premia which is paid over a 15 to 20-year 
period. 
This might be seen as a counter-intuitive finding because, due to the small-scale 
nature of farm forestry in Ireland and the lack of forestry knowledge, it has been usual 
for planting to be undertaken by specialist companies in return for payment by the 
farmer of the planting grant. Also, it is generally recognised that it was not until the 
introduction of an annual premium in 1989 that there was any farmer interest in 
forestry. However, there are at least two ways in which higher planting grants tended 
to stimulate higher levels of private planting. First, with higher grants, contractors 
would have had a greater incentive to seek out farmers to encourage them to sign up 
for the scheme. Secondly, in some cases farmers retained a portion of the planting 
grant through supplying their own labour or other services to the contractor.[9] 
While these are the appropriate figures for making comparisons of the effect of 
equivalent government expenditure on forestry planting grants and subsidies, it is not 
so easy to interpret these in policy terms. But, noting that the NPV of a €1 increase 
in the annual forestry premium paid over 20 years is €13.09,l19] it is easy to calculate 
that the national increase in afforestation as a result of a €1 increase in the annual 
forestry premium is 9.16 x 13.09 or 120 hectares. Therefore, increasing the forestry 
premium (an annual payment) by €1 will be nearly six times more effective than a €1 
increase in the forestry planting grant (which is only paid once). However, the ultimate 
cost to the Exchequer will be more than thirteen times greater. 
AGRICULTURAL PROFITABILITY 
Agricultural production is forestry's biggest competitor for land. Increases in 
agricultural returns - as measured by the gross margin from farming - would be 
expected to reduce farmers' interest in planting land to trees and vice versa. Any 
analysis of agricultural margins in comparison to forestry margins must take into 
account that forestry will only compete with marginal agricultural land activities and a 
suitable agricultural gross margin must be based on low-return agricultural activities 
such as cattle and sheep farming. The agricultural gross margin used to compare with 
forestry is therefore a weighted gross margin of different sheep and beef farming 
[19] This figure is the discounted value of a €1 increase in the annual forestry premia using a 5% discount rate over a 20 year 
period. The following formula is used for this calculation 
I,19 1 
i=O (1+ .05)' 
systems. It would be desirable to try to capture the separate impact of the growing 
importance of extensification payments, but their influence on the demand for land is 
very farm specific and there is no easy summary measure available. Instead, these 
payments are simply included in the agricultural gross margin variable. 
Although as expected the agricultural gross margin appears with a negative sign, it is 
found to be an insignificant explanatory factor. This is not an unexpected result as the 
higher level of forestry planting in the early 1990s, when taken in conjunction with the 
upward trend in livestock units, indicates that overall competition between forestry and 
agriculture did not prove to be very restrictive at least up to and including 1995.l20) 
One explanation for this is that up to recently the land planted with forestry was 
marginal land that yielded little or no agricultural return. Due to recent developments in 
the agricultural sector and as standards for planting are raised, the competition 
between agriculture and forestry will increasingly intensity and this variable may be 
significant in the future. 
THE AREA ENTERED INTO REPS 
As previously stated, serious competition for land exists between forestry and REPS. 
Therefore, the area entered into REPS will be expected to have a negative relationship 
with the annual rate of private afforestation. The marginal effect of the area entered 
into REPS suggests that, for every thousand hectares so employed, twenty less 
hectares will be planted with private forestry. The average area entered into REPS per 
annum in the period between 1994 and 1999 was 266,667 hectares. Therefore, the 
marginal effect suggests that, on average, the level of private forestry planting has 
declined by 5,333 hectares per annum due to competition from this scheme alone. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
On the basis of these findings, it is possible to estimate the changes necessary in 
subsidy policies in order for Ireland to meet its current afforestation target of 20,000 
hectares per annum. Either the standard forestry planting grant or the level of premia 
in 1999 would need to be increased by approximately 18%, ceteris paribus. In this 
context, the increase in forestry grants of up to 40% and the increase in premia 
payments of up to 33% which were introduced in late 1999 should help to restore 
interest in forestry planting among farmers in the coming years. 
The marginal effect of the forestry planting grant and forestry subsidies variable in 
comparison to the forestry market margin variable confirms that, in current 
[20) Kearney, 2001 
circumstances, the development of the forestry sector depends on State subsidies. 
In fact, the expected forestry market margin would have to increase by a multiple of 
twenty in order to meet the current forestry target based on 1999 planting figures. 
The analysis suggests that increasing upfront payments may be both a persuasive 
and cost efficient method of increasing the level of private forestry planting. Since the 
most recent increase in forestry grants in late 1999, planting grant payments are now 
related entirely to the actual costs incurred. Therefore, increasing forestry planting 
grant payments cannot be pursued as an incentive measure. However, tiering the 
premium payments over time so that a higher proportion of their value is paid in the 
earlier years would have a similar effect. This might be applied in a modification of the 
current Farm Partnership Scheme. The main alternation suggested is to allow the 
landowner to choose whether or not to receive the entire expected timber revenue in 
advance. The government, through Coillte, would then receive this revenue when 
clear-cutting occurred.l9) 
Although increases in forestry subsidies are shown to be an effective method of 
increasing the level of private forestry planting, their incentive effect may be reduced if 
farmers fear that their future value might be undermined by inflation. The risk from 
inflation could be removed by indexed linking forestry subsidies. However, this would 
be a very radical step and would create a precedent that all agricultural direct 
payments should also be index linked which is unlikely to be welcomed by policy-
makers in Brussels. 
The introduction of REPS has been one of the main reasons for the decline in the 
level of private forestry planting in recent years. It is therefore natural to look at 
reforms to REPS to make it more forestry-friendly. Various policy measures could be 
put in place to integrate the current afforestation programme and REPS. Currently, all 
areas suitable for afforestation on applicant sites for REPS must be reported to the 
Forest Service. Further efforts might be made to explain to farmers the value to them 
of planting this land to forestry. A more draconian measure would be to require the 
landowner to plant these areas in order to be eligible for REPS payments. Such a 
proposal would appear to run counter to the REPS objective to encourage more 
environmentally-friendly farming and would be unlikely to be acceptable to any of the 
parties involved. 
An alternative approach would be to allow the land planted with forestry to be eligible 
for both the forest premium and REPS payments. However, this would only be 
justified if the forestry management produced environmental benefits over and above 
those which might be expected from normal good forestry management practice. For 
example, allowing public access to such land might be seen as warranting an 
additional payment. 
Finally, adoption of the Commission proposals for the Mid-Term Review of the CAP 
announced in July 2002 would make a significant contribution to enhancing the 
relative attractiveness of forestry. These proposals envisage that farmers' eligibility for 
direct payments under agricultural policy schemes would be based on their historical 
entitlements and would not require them to continue the production of crops or 
animals to maintain their eligibility. Many farmers will find agricultural production at 
current market prices unattractive. As a result, the relative attractiveness of forestry 
will be dramatically improved, particularly if farmers can retain both their agricultural 
direct payments and receive, in addition, the usual forestry subsidies. If this turns out 
to be the case when the negotiations on the Mid-Term Review are completed, a boom 
in forestry planting in the next few years could be the result. 
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APPENDIX 
The model to be estimated can be written as: 
Privit = f(Formarginit, Forplantgrit, Forsubit, Agrimarginit, AreaREPSit) 
where 
Privit = the number of hectares planted with private forestry in county i in year t 
Formarginit = the level of the expected forestry market margin achieved per hectare 
in county i in year t 
Forplantgrit = the level of the forestry planting grant per hectare in county i in year t 
Forsubit = the level of forestry subsidies per hectare in county i in year t 
Agrimarginit = the agricultural gross margin per hectare in county i in year t 
AreaREPSit = the area of land entered into REPS in hectares in county i in year t. 
